LUIS BETTENCOURT: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen
and welcome.
My name is Luis Bettencourt.
I'm the Pritzker Director of the Mansueto
Institute for Urban Innovation.
I'm also a professor at the Department
of Ecology and Evolution, and the college here
at the University.
So it's a pleasure to welcome you
to this series of conversations and discussions
about China and the United States.
And I look forward to seeing you here today
and make this an active and exciting engagement.
I'll see you also in the final panel of the day, which
I'll be chairing.
So I'll be seeing who's here now and who's here then.
I'm sure you'll be here all day.
It's going to be exciting.
I'm also very pleased that this year's theme is
on issues of the rural urban continuum and really
on issues of urbanization and innovation
in our two great nations.
These transformations, as you know, are monumental.
They're really changing the fabric of our nations
for all our people.
And they're creating tremendous opportunities, as well as
familiar but larger challenges.
They are increasingly similar, I think, between our two nations.
People increasingly live in interconnected, complex,
dynamical societies in ways that allows
us to learn from each other.
So it is really paramount that we
learn from each other's experience,
that we know about each other's experience.
And that we learn to solve problems together
that affect not only us in our own nations, but the world
at large in terms of growth, stability, and sustainability.
So to get us started, it is my great pleasure
to introduce Daniel Diermeier.
Daniel is the David Lee Shillinglaw Distinguished
Service professor at the Harris School of Policy
and the college, and he serves as our provost
for the University.
So it is in that capacity that Daniel has responsibility
and oversees all our academic and research programs
across the University.
He's been doing this with great energy and imagination,
as you'll hear.
And so I think you'll feel that the University of Chicago
is a very dynamic place, open to the world,
interested in really understanding
China, its cities, and its many social and economic phenomena.
So please join me in welcoming Daniel
who will deliver the welcome remarks for the University.
Daniel.
[APPLAUSE]
DANIEL DIERMEIER: Thank you, Luis,
for the kind introduction.
Professor Cui, Mr. Rank, General Consul Hong, Executive Director
Wong, and distinguished guests, on behalf
of the University of Chicago, it's
my pleasure to welcome you to the 2017 US-China Forum.
For the third consecutive year now, we
gather together renowned experts, scholars,
policymakers, and private sector innovators
to build upon the University's treasured tradition
of facilitating collaboration and open dialogue between China
and the United States.
Since its inception in 1890, University of Chicago
has engaged with scholars, students, and institutions
from around the world.
Over the years, our scholars have transcended borders
to pursue groundbreaking research, and, like today,
we have welcomed global thought leaders to our campus.
Historically, we're particularly proud of our connection
to China.
University of Chicago alumnus Yang Chen-Ning and Lee
Tsung-Dao become the first Chinese citizens
to win a Nobel Prize.
And the University's Far Eastern Studies program
has gained a world-renowned reputation
as a center for excellence in the study of Chinese languages
and civilizations.
China has become important in the world of ideas
and intellectual engagement in recent decades,
and the ubiquitous presence of the Chinese team
manifests itself at the University
in many different ways.
Chinese scholars and researchers form a growing presence
across a variety of intellectual disciplines,
important university, ranging in economics, the cutting edge
science and technology business, public policy,
and the humanistic disciplines.
Chinese students now make up the largest portion
of our international student body,
and they are an increasingly vibrant and active part
of the University of Chicago community.
And then finally, studies of issues related to China
have always been and continue to be of tremendous interest
to the University's research and teaching community.
As many of you will know, we have
made significant investments in our Beijing center, and most
recently, on the process of finalizing
our new center in Hong Kong.
The University of Chicago, therefore,
consider it an imperative that we continue
to deepen our understanding of China,
through gatherings such as today,
if we are able to maintain and deepen our academic eminence
and our relevance in an area of increasing
international interaction and interdependence.
Hence, the selection by our esteemed partner,
the China-US Exchange Foundation,
of the timely theme for today's forum,
Innovation on the Urban Rural Continuum.
Today we will examine the way in which innovations
in rural and urban settings are shaping the political, culture,
and economic dialogues in both the United States and in China.
The discussion comes at a perfect time
for the University of Chicago, as we as a university
expand and continue to develop our portfolio
of urban activities.
Chief among these activities is the new Mansueto Institute
of Urban Innovation, led by inaugural Pritzker
Director, Luis Bettencourt.
This is an important new initiative at the University
to develop knowledge of the fundamental processes that
drive, shape, and sustain cities.
And like this interdisciplinary convening,
the Mansueto Institute will bring together social, natural,
and computational sciences, bring them
together with the arts and the humanities
to explore the boundaries of a new field of urban science
and practice.
Today's event also reflects our commitment
to deepening our global partnerships.
I would like to extend my deepest gratitude to Mr. Tung
Chee Hwa and the China-US Exchange Foundation
represented here today by executive director Mr. Alan
Wong.
We are grateful for their support
and for their collaborations on this forum.
Thank you very much, Alan.
[APPLAUSE]
I would also like to thank Anne Dodge at the University
of Chicago, who, as well as numerous of our partners
and contributors, have helped to make this day possible.
We look forward to a stimulating collaborative
and engaging discourse this year and in many years to come.
And it is in this spirit that I now welcome to this stage
our honored guest from the Consulate General
of the People's Republic of China,
Consul General, Hong Lei.
Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]
HONG LEI: Honorable Provost, Diermeier,
Director Bettencourt, Professor Cui from CICR,
and Secretary Wong.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is a great pleasure for me
to attend the US-China Forum 2017,
hosted by the University of Chicago
and co-sponsored by the China-US Exchange Foundation.
First of all, I would like to extend our warm congratulations
to University of Chicago for Professor Thaler winning
the Nobel Prize in economics this year.
[APPLAUSE]
This is the third US-China Forum,
and I attend the previous one last year.
For three years, the forum has focused
on opportunities as well as challenges shared both by China
and the United States.
And provided a great platform for dialogues among political,
business, and academia leaders in the two countries,
which have enhanced our mutual understanding and friendship.
On behalf of the Chinese consulates in Chicago,
I would like to experience our sincere thanks
to the University of Chicago and the China-US Exchange
Foundation for your contributions
to the development of China-US relationship.
This forum well take a close look
at innovation of urban rural integration, a major topic
both in China and the United States,
while promoting urbanization.
China faces an arduous challenge of a wide urban rural gap
and unbalanced regional development.
Since the reform and opening up, China
has proceeded with new urbanization and the roll
out reform measures in household registration, urban functions,
rural development, and housing system.
China has charted a new path of urbanization
with Chinese characteristics, which
unleash the vast potentials in domestic demand.
In 2016, China's urbanization rate
reached 57.35%, 4.78% higher than of 2012,
with an average annual growth of 1.2%.
In April 2017, the Chinese government
announced that we would establish the [? Shiyan ?]
area in Hubei province.
This is a historic choice that China
has made to further boost new organization driven
by innovation.
The fast progress of urbanization
is just part of China's historic, economic, and social
development.
In the recent five years of the Chinese Communist Party's
18th National Congress, China's economy
has registered a stable performance
with good momentum for growth.
China's annual GDP grew at 7.2% on average,
higher than 2.5% of world average,
and 4% of developing economies.
China is implementing the strategy of innovation driven
development, optimizing the industrial structure
and promoting synchronized development
of industrialization, IT application, urbanization,
and agricultural modernization.
Thanks to all these efforts, the living
standard of Chinese people has been greatly improved.
Next week, the Communist Party of China
will convene its 19th National Congress,
which will give a new direction of China's development,
and draw a blueprint for China's development
in the next five years and beyond,
and lead China's efforts to build a moderately
prosperous society and socialism with Chinese characteristics.
Standing at a new standing point,
China will undoubtedly provide more strategic opportunities
for the United States of America and the rest of the world.
As the largest developing country,
and the developed country, and the two largest economies
in the world, China and the United States
share special responsibilities and wide common interest
in upholding world peace, stability, and prosperity,
as well as promoting global development.
The strong development of China-US relations
is in the interest of both of our peoples
and also means the common aspiration
of the international community.
Next month, President Donald Trump
will pay a state visit to China.
We would like to work with the American side,
follow the consensus reached by President Xi Jinping
and President Trump, and expand pragmatic cooperation
across the board, so as to open even
wider prospects and brighter future
for our bilateral relationship.
Against this background, it is of great significance
for China and the United States to strengthen our discussion
on how to narrow the urban rural gap.
All the participants today are senior scholars and top experts
in our two countries.
I hope you can have an in-depth discussion
and contribute good suggestions on the innovative developments
of urban rural integration and the China-US
cooperation in relevant areas.
In closing, I sincerely wish today's forum a great success.
Thank you very much.
[APPLAUSE]
STEVE EDWARDS: Good morning.
My name is Steve Edwards.
I am the Vice President and Chief Content Officer of WBEZ,
Chicago's NPR member station, and the former Executive
Director of the Institute of Politics here
at the University of Chicago.
So it is wonderful to be back on campus.
And I'm especially honored to be here for today's US-China Forum
and thrilled to be in conversation with our two
distinguished speakers on the topic of bilateral relations
in the Trump-Xi era.
We felt that this conversation would help frame and set
the context for which the rest of the sessions
today will follow.
And given the fact that we have President Trump's upcoming
state visit to China next month, these questions
couldn't be more timely.
I think it's all of us recognize the relationship
between the United States and China is the most consequential
in the world today and in the future, as we think
about the future direction of global economics,
global security, global environmental conditions,
among many others.
And of course, we've also witnessed
that, with the election in November of 2016,
the Trump administration has ushered
in, not only a new set of issues and priorities,
but frankly a new approach to dealing
with critical issues between our country,
including the issues of trade, climate change, and relations
with North Korea.
So with us to share their insights
are two leading experts and thought leaders
on the bilateral relationship.
We'll have each of them deliver remarks.
Then I will engage the two of them in a brief conversation
to synthesize and further the discussion.
And then of course, we'll open it up to all of you
for your questions for each of them.
So we begin this morning, with remarks from Professor Cui
Liru, who is currently Senior Adviser of China Institute's
Contemporary International Relations, also known as CICR.
He's a member of the Committee of Foreign Affairs
of the Chinese People's Political Consultative
Conference, and also a senior advisor
to multiple institutions for the study of national security
and foreign relations.
Professor Cui is also a board member
of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, NTI,
here in the United States.
Professor Cui served as president of CICR
from 2005 to 2013, Director General
of the Institute of World Information, which
is affiliated to the State Information Center,
from 1996 to 2004.
He also served as counselor at the Permanent
Mission of the PRC to the United Nations from 1992 to 1994.
He graduated from Fudan University in Shanghai in 1976,
and his research interests include US foreign policy,
US-China relations, international security issues,
and Chinese foreign policy.
We'll hear from him first, and then we'll
hear from David Rank.
David Rank spent 27 years as State Department Foreign
Service Officer, including his final assignment as Deputy
Chief of Mission, and, following the 2016 election,
as charge d'affaires, acting Ambassador at the US embassy
in Beijing.
In addition to six Foreign Service assignments in greater
China, he also served at the US embassies
in Kabul, Athens, and Port Louis, Mauritius.
His domestic assignments included
jobs as Director of the State's Office of Afghanistan Affairs,
Senior Adviser to the Special Representative for Afghanistan
and Pakistan, Special Assistant to the Undersecretary
of State for Political Affairs, and Korea desk officer.
From 2012 to 2013, he was Dean and Virginia Rusk fellow
at Georgetown University's Institute
for the Study of Diplomacy.
And in 2015, he received the State Department's
Distinguished Honor Award for his role
in the release of the only American service member held
by the enemy in Afghanistan.
Please join me in welcoming both of them
to our stage in our forum this morning.
[APPLAUSE]
So without further ado, Professor Cui,
we will begin with you.
[APPLAUSE]
CUI LIRU: Thank you, Professor Edward.
First of all, let me express my gratefulness to China-US
Exchange Foundations.
And just add to the arrangement, I'm
very much honored to have the opportunity
to come to these very important occasions.
And it is my great honor to be here to have this presentation
and have exchange of views with you.
And again, I would also express my high respect
to the University of Chicago.
And this is so famous in the world and famous in China.
So again, this is also my great honor
to be here to witness this important event.
In this session, the topic is China-US relations,
in Xi Jinping and Trump period.
I think this, of course, is a very important period.
It's important because our both countries
are undergoing very important changes, domestically
and also their external relations.
But I would like to emphasize, all these things
happened in a large--
in the context of a larger picture.
The larger picture is, we are all
undergoing a very much historical transition.
And China-US relations is undergoing
a historical transition.
So this historic transition, in many ways,
characterize our relations in, I don't know how long,
at least in 10, or 15, or 20 years.
As an ancient Chinese saying goes,
he who does not have long term consideration cannot be free
of present troubles.
In this transition, change has brought
additional uncertainties, and the future orientation
of bilateral ties will have to be reassessed.
The established balance of this relation
has been changed because of the evolution of the power creation
and the deeper interdependence developed between China
and the United States, including power structure, re-balancing,
and the vastly growing ties between the two countries.
This is an unprecedented evolution process
of the two major countries' relations,
which has brought a number of complicated issues
and uncertainties of the future development.
Dramatic economic development with high speed growth,
consistently, in about three decades,
has quickly driven China's modernization process
and comprehensive national power to a new level.
And equally important, all of these
have happened with a parallel process
of China's rapid engagement with the outside world.
With this tremendous spillover effect,
China's peaceful rising has become the most important
development in the globalization and the multipolarization
process after the Cold War was over.
China's arising has changed the parity, or rather
a special balance, and the dynamics of the relationship
between the two major countries, I mean,
China and the United States.
On one hand, America's power, superiority,
and the political predominance have relatively declined,
while China's capacity and the diplomatic positivity
have been extended.
On the other hand, there has been deeply growing
interdependent China-US economic ties.
The impact of a changing balance have been reflected on all
these facts, all dimensions of China-US relations--
namely bilateral, Asian Pacific regional,
and the global issues.
Consequently, there has been growing
tensions and the new issues between Washington and Beijing.
But in my view, the general situation
of these newly developed imbalances
has been a mixture of two parallel growing trends,
that is of with strategic competition
and pragmatic cooperation.
Sometimes people compare China-US relationship
with a marriage, since the two countries
established diplomatic ties in the last century, these 1970s.
This relationship should have reached maturity.
But just like a matured marriage,
may also sometime encounter serious problems.
So, too, has the China-US relationship.
Now a worrisome development is that the strategic competition
between the two countries is gathering momentum.
And this seems likely replacing the cooperation,
which, previously, [INAUDIBLE] our relationship I
feel very different atmosphere from here and Washington, DC.
And we're now in Washington DC in that discussion,
our strategic competition with these think tank peoples.
People become worrisome.
Even we talk about President Obama's first visit to China,
and we feel very much uncertain about result of this visit.
But when we come here, we talk about these topics,
we see another dimensions our relations, that is we're
partners.
And our cooperations will develop strongly.
So a prevalent view now holds that since China's rising
challenges, US dominance, the two countries
will fall into [INAUDIBLE] trap, wherein
mutual desires and mutual trust bring
the rising power and the established power
into conflict.
If America and China do not manage our disputes well,
this maybe may become a reality.
It is no longer important whether this argument
is correct or not if both sides believe it is a great risk.
We need to find a solution.
The obvious way out is for either one or both parties
to change.
But thus far, there has been little sign of that happening.
At the very least however, we can manage the problem
and prevent them from spinning out of control before finding
our ultimate solution.
For this purpose, the two governments
have made attempts to manage the strategic competition,
including endeavors to control risks in the crisis.
This is the most feasible, realistic way
for the bilateral relationship to peacefully go
through this inevitable, or maybe
some volatile, transitional period.
In recent years, Chinese, and Americans, and the militaries
have made headways in promoting communications and dialogues
in various levels, as well as facilitating mutual trust
and building risk management mechanisms.
Increasing competitiveness between China and the US
will inevitable affect the judgment
of each other's strategic purpose.
We have witnessed the increasing effect
of the third party factors on US-China relations in the Asian
Pacific.
When the two parties coordinate and cooperate to deal
with contentious issues in the region,
things become more complicated, as the two parties cooperation
on the North Korea nuclear crisis.
They face unprecedented test of both mutual trust
and the strategical wisdom.
US intervention on the issues of China-Japan Maritime
disputes in the East and the South China Sea,
territorial disputes, in the name of its security
obligations to its allies, has not only
brought a new, complex problem to its relationship with China,
but, of course, begin to question what role the US
allies will play in the security order of the Asian Pacific.
This will be a question of increasing significance
for future China-US relations, the answer to which
needs to be discussed among China, US,
and other stakeholding countries.
Competition has also become increasingly
prominent in China-US economic and trade relations.
Trump has repeatedly--
President Trump has repeatedly pledged
to resolve the so-called problem of war and fairness
in trade with China.
And that takes it as important goal of materialized
his America First principle.
And has, on multiple occasions, threatened China with sanction.
The Trump administration has just
decided to promote Chinese trade practice and sanction
301 of the 1974 Trade Act.
In response, China has vowed to take all necessary measures
to safeguard it's right and interests,
not inspiring worries about a potential trade war.
The issue of a potential trade war,
however, is more like a quarrel, as two parties in a marriage
enter a midlife crisis.
There are plenty of reasons to believe, in my view,
the foundation for mutually beneficial win-win cooperation
in China-US economic and trade ties are solid enough.
Forces in favor of collaboration are strong enough,
and the economic and the trade ties
will continue to support bilateral relations.
Most importantly, these factors will support a new China-US
relationship in the future.
Changes in comparative strengths and
the increasing close bilateral ties
are altering US-China relationship.
China's peaceful rise is the acting force
driving this change, and the US re-balancing
is the response to it.
The two parties interaction features both competition
and the cooperation.
And this will be characteristic of the transitional period
in the next one or two decades.
Within that time frame, the ideal scenario
is to shift the China-US relations from focusing mainly
on managing competition and preventing confrontation,
to a more steady and active process of co-evolution,
as Dr. Kissinger said.
For that purpose, politicians, strategists and the diplomats
in both countries, especially the top leaders,
must not only confront present problems,
but look to long term goals.
They must not only reflect on history,
but also build consensus on the future state
of bilateral relations.
The further development of China-US relationship
rests on the endeavors they make together.
The past half century of China-US relations
demonstrate that pragmatism and a rational weighing
of advantages and disadvantages can always dominate,
and decision-making on both side a extremely important issues.
This is why, in my view, we can be cautiously
optimistic about the future.
Thank you very much.
[APPLAUSE]
STEVE EDWARDS: Professor Cui, I thank
you so much for those remarks.
We now turn the podium over to David Rank for his remarks.
David.
[APPLAUSE]
DAVID RANK: Thanks, Steve.
And again, thank you to the China-US Exchange Foundation.
It's great to be here.
I spent 27 years in government.
And I would come to events like this,
and they would stick a piece of paper,
or a stack of papers in my hand, and tell me
this is what I could say.
[LAUGHTER]
And I would look at it, and I'd think, oh, this isn't me.
I don't want to have to say this.
So I wrote it myself this time.
And when I got up this morning, I looked at it,
and I said, oh, I don't want to say this.
So instead, I'm going to read off of this sheet.
[LAUGHTER]
Hopefully, it'll be a little more interesting.
First of all, Steve, thanks.
It's great to be here.
As a kid who grew up a few miles south of here
and spent my youth surreptitiously
listening to WBEZ--
STEVE EDWARDS: [LAUGHS]
DAVID RANK: I would just want to say,
what an extraordinary contribution your station
and Public Radio makes to the dialogue
here in the United States.
So it's great to see you are moving back
to that great institution.
And for those of you who don't know Professor Cui or CICR,
I just want to assure you what a tremendous honor
it is to have you here.
It is-- both Professor Cui and his institution,
are renowned for their intelligence,
and their integrity, and their insights.
So it's really an honor to share a stage with you.
And I really-- as you were talking,
I reflected on your comments about an old married couple.
And I thought, how perfect that analogy
is, because you and I are like an old married couple.
[LAUGHTER]
We're talking about the same issue,
but we're going to say entirely different things.
[LAUGHTER]
And so maybe that's a sign of optimism.
So last November, there was, I would say,
an event that shook the world, that happened here
in the United States.
But people around the world took notice,
where a small group of outsiders, people
who had been perennially ridiculed,
found themselves suddenly at the center of American discussion.
And what had been, for a long time, unthinkable,
had become reality.
And I just want to say that it's great--
that-- last year I was in Beijing when that happened.
But this year, it's really a privilege
to be back in Chicago in October, when the Cubs are
playing post-season baseball.
[LAUGHTER]
But I was--
I'm a South Sider, but I grew up,
by an accident of TV stations and geography,
being a Cubs fan.
And as I look back, it really--
being a Cubs fan is a fantastic preparation
for being a diplomat--
[LAUGHTER]
For working in places like China,
and Afghanistan, and the other dealing with the issues
I've dealt with.
Because it teaches, you first and foremost,
to be a realist, right?
It teaches you to be an optimist in the face of all evidence
to the contrary.
And it teaches you to take a long term perspective
on things.
And I think that has served me well,
working on China relations, certainly,
and in general in my career.
As I was thinking about the topic of today's--
what I was asked to talk about, bilateral relations
in the Trump-Xi era, I thought I would take a little more
of a long term perspective, and talk about history rather
than current events so much.
And I would talk, rather than the high level history,
I would talk from a very personal perspective
of my, sort of, experience over the last three decades
of US-China relations.
So I was, in the mid 1980s, a-- like the students in this
audi--
probably, actually not exactly like
the students in this audience--
I found myself-- I was a history major at a university not far
from here.
And I realized, late in my college career,
that I had no discernible, marketable skills.
I could think of nothing in my background or experience
that would make an employer want to hire me.
[LAUGHTER]
And because I was interested in doing something international,
I said, well, I ought to make myself
a specialist in something.
I ought to really focus on some part of the world.
And so, you know, the 1980s, if you
wanted to do that, you look around
and, on economic issues or commercial issues,
Japan was the envy of the world, right?
It was, Japan is number one.
The Japanese were buying everything in the United States
from Rockefeller Plaza to Pebble Beach.
And they were going from strength to strength.
And I thought, well, you know, Japanese is a tough language.
[LAUGHTER]
I don't have enough time to learn it.
That's just not-- that's not going to work.
And so the next thing I thought was, what
about on the political side?
But there, it was the US-Soviet relations, the Cold War
conflict.
And again, Russian's a hard language to learn.
[LAUGHTER]
Everyone was running into that field,
because that was really what the future of US diplomacy and US
foreign policy was.
So I was kind of late to the game.
So I thought, OK, well, China's a big place.
There're not a lot of people studying Chinese.
Maybe I'll try that.
And I did.
I stumbled into a scholarship.
I studied in Taiwan.
And while I was there, took the Foreign Service test,
and I guess the phrase is-- we have an ancient American
saying--
the rest is history.
[LAUGHTER]
But what do I--
I take at least a couple of lessons from that.
The first one I take is that just because something appears
to be so today does not mean that it
will be that way forever.
And I keep that in mind.
For the students in the room, I would also
say that what I learned was, you don't
have to be right all the time.
You just have to be right once and stick with it.
That certainly worked for me.
And I guess one additional thing I would tell you,
is that there is some benefit to government dysfunction,
at least at a personal level.
I took the Foreign Service test, I told you, in the late 80s.
And I did OK, I passed it.
I ended up on the hiring register.
But, you know, my score was not that great.
And I, frankly, would have never been
hired, because every time I got close to the point
where they would call my name, a new group of people
would take the Foreign Service test and score better than me,
and end up getting the call instead of me.
But then, in one of these periodic fights
in our government, the State Department ran out of a budget
to give the Foreign Service test.
And so, like the British Navy emptying
the jails to man their ships, the State Department
worked its way through the list of people who had
already passed and hired me.
So there is hope for those of you who despair about what's
going on in Washington now.
[LAUGHTER]
So then I ended up going into the Foreign Service.
In 1990, they sent me-- because I spoke Chinese at that point--
to Shanghai.
And this is where, starting in 1990, looking back,
you see the rise of China, the incredible economic growth,
and you think, wow, it was inevitable.
It had to happen.
That's not the way it looked in Shanghai of 1990.
It, by no means, looked like what
has come to be was going to come to be.
It wasn't clear at all back then that the Chinese system
would even survive, right?
1990, this is the year after the Chinese state used the military
against its own people in Tienanmen Square.
The Soviet Union had just collapsed,
and there was widespread expectation that look,
this system simply cannot survive.
Economically, Shanghai didn't look
like a dynamic, commercial city.
It was gray.
There were very few markets.
There were seven private cars in the city when I lived there.
There was, I think, one restaurant worth going to,
a private restaurant nearby.
Internationally, China had very, very little say.
They had a veto, they had a seat on the Security Council.
But mainly, the Chinese foreign policy
was one of leadership of the third world, rhetorically,
but really not an important role in actual fact.
US-China relations were sort of bumping along.
But with the end of the Cold War,
the importance of that relationship
was really sort of starting to fade.
And I would say what changed things
is the topic of today's conversation, which is change
on the rural urban continuum.
At the end of my time in Shanghai,
Deng Xiaoping, who was then the leader of China,
made what is very famous in China, his southern tour.
He visited the cities of the South
and those special economic zones,
which had been designated as sort of experimental points
for trying out some new economic ideas.
And you know, at that point China wasn't long
out of the Cultural Revolution.
It had been more than 10 years, but people
were-- they had heard talk of reform and opening,
but they were afraid that if they really jumped down,
they would have the rug pulled out from under their feet.
That the winds would shift politically,
and they would find themselves exposed
to the sorts of political campaigns
that had marked the decade previous.
And it was only when Deng went down to the southern cities,
to the special economic zones, that they really had confidence
that this time it was real.
The era of politics in the lead was over
and economics, and trade, and dynamism
were the policy of the future.
And the really important thing was,
the people working in those factories
weren't the workers from the urban, state-owned sector,
but young people from the countryside.
And that's what set off the-- so really the story of the next 30
years, not only in China and the region,
but really around the world, has been
the story of the move of those rural workers
into the Chinese economy, and then, increasingly,
into the global economy.
I went back to China at the end of the 1990s.
China was in-- it was a country in the midst of transformation.
And again, if I can talk about my personal background
a little bit, my job was, sort of,
to be the political risk analyst of the embassy,
to look at, yeah, things look OK.
People are getting richer, but what could go wrong?
And at that point there were a lot
of things that could go wrong.
The state-owned enterprises were increasingly inefficient,
they were building up debt.
There was a lot of-- there were tensions
between urban workers and the rural competitors
they saw coming in.
It was not at all, again, preordained
that the transformation would be successful.
At the political level, our relations were terrible.
I think they've never been worse.
I got there in 1998 with Bill Clinton, and the Beijing
Spring, and the release of a number of dissidents.
After Bill Clinton left, they were rearrested.
Not long after that, the US accidentally
bombed the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia.
Not long after that, a US military aircraft
over the South China Sea was accidentally knocked out
of the air by a Chinese plane.
The background of this was a very contentious and very
public debate on Chinese entry into the World Trade
Organization.
Here in the United States it required a vote by Congress.
And it was tough.
But you know, what really linked the two countries together
was the growing and--
the strong and growing commercial relationship
between our two countries, and what was a,
I think, very much a mutually complimentary economic set
of economic structures.
I left and then didn't go back to China until 2006.
And then it was 2006, 2008, it was a remarkable change.
I mean, China was even more prosperous.
And it was a much more confident place.
And I won't dwell too long except for to say
that the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the opening ceremonies
had the feeling of China's coming out party.
That this was China returning to the role
it had traditionally filled as one
of the great countries in the world
and certainly the most important country in the region.
So a lot of Chinese were justifiably
proud at that moment of what their country had achieved.
I think three weeks later, when Lehman Brothers collapsed here
in the United States, they saw that
as sort of the other side of the coin, which
was the death knell of the Western economic model,
that China really was going to return
to predominance much more quickly than even
they had dared to hope.
I went back again in 2016, a couple of years ago.
And there were still, I mean, there were--
again, China changes very quickly.
There were as many changes in that decade
as the previous decades before.
But some of the confidence was gone.
Some of the problems they thought they had licked
were popping their heads back up.
State-owned enterprises were still having problems
building up debt.
The US-China relationship was as contentious as ever.
It was a very difficult relationship.
But I will say on the bilateral side, our relationship,
I noticed it was striking how different
our relationship with the People's Republic
was at that point.
We had always talked about a cooperative partnership
and terms like that.
Prior to 2016, or at least the years running up to that,
that was largely nonsense.
We didn't actually cooperate all that much, in concrete terms.
By 2016, it was striking how much
we were doing on major issues around the world.
And I think of things the Obama administration achieved,
like the Paris Agreement, which was
at its core a US-China agreement.
Things like the Iran deal, both of which
are now in the process of being unraveled
by the current administration.
But also cooperation on global health, on oceans,
and just a range of issues where we
had talked a good game before but now was very clearly true.
And now to get to, in the fading minutes of my presentation,
the topic of the conversation, which
is bilateral relations in the Trump-Xi era.
I'm concerned.
I'm concerned for a number of reasons
by what's going on here in the United States,
not just by this administration, but by-- in general,
by the lack of courage in American political circles
to make a case for US leadership in the world.
And as a symbolic of that was the fact
that neither of the two presidential candidates
in the last election, nor Bernie Sanders,
nor any of the other major voices
spoke in support of the TPP, the Trans-Pacific Partnership,
which was, essentially, the next step in the United States
promoting a multilateral rules based order.
And even the Obama administration,
the administration that negotiated it,
wasn't willing to defend it publicly.
I mean, the strategy for passing TPP was essentially
to hope that Hillary won, and then pass it in the lame duck
session.
And at the same time, I'm worried
about developments on the Chinese side that make it--
increase-- I mean, the concerns about globalization
are founded in the fact that, in a number of things.
One, in the United States anyway,
an unwillingness to take on the domestic governance
responsibilities of accommodating globalization.
But also, by the fact that the global system wasn't designed
to accommodate a country as large as China,
with an economy as dynamic as China's, and which
operates on rules often outside of what's
envisioned in things like the WTO.
And I look at, with real concern,
about things like Made in China 2025,
a plan to do in high tech industries what
Chinese plans for steel, and aluminum, and things
like cement did in those industries, which
is create global hope for oversupply,
certainly, oversupply within China.
Some of those commodities aren't really exportable,
and so the rest of the world didn't feel them.
But certainly, if you see that the tensions in steel,
the steel industry, and other targeted industries,
you know what that has created internationally.
And my concern is that we'll see the same sorts of things
in industries which are much more transferable, much
more exportable.
And that's just going to make the job of maintaining
the system that has worked pretty well for Americans,
has worked pretty well for Chinese,
and has worked pretty well for those people,
whether they're Chinese or American,
or anywhere around the world making
the transition from a rural economy
to an urban global based economy.
So Steve, I'll stop there.
But thank you all.
It is terrific to be here.
STEVE EDWARDS: Right.
[APPLAUSE]
Thank you both so much for those terrific remarks.
We'll have a short conversation and then
open it up to you for your questions on these themes,
as well.
I was taking feverish notes, because there's
so much richness to get into.
And I want to talk more about this sense
of strategic cooperation versus strategic competition.
But David, let me go to you for a moment,
because one conspicuous absence from your biography,
that many people in this room will know,
is the fact that earlier this year, you stepped down,
resigned from not only your post,
but from the State Department following
the Trump administration's decision
to withdraw the United States from the Paris Climate
Agreement.
You talked about how important that decision has been, widely,
for you and the things that you care about,
both as a professional, a parent, as a Christian,
you've said.
I want to know from--
I can imagine over the long arc of your career
in diplomacy, that there have been plenty of decisions
that administrations have made that also
didn't align with those things.
So I want to know, not just why was it so important for you,
but what impact does this have on that broader
landscape of US-China relations and the kind
of strategic cooperation that both you and professor
Cui were talking about?
DAVID RANK: Right.
Yeah, I mean, certainly, there--
Look, to be a public servant, a civil servant,
you have to make decision-- you have
to implement policies that you don't always agree with.
I mean, I would say as a republic, as a country,
you want that.
You want civil servants who disagree, who are smart,
have strong opinions, disagree at times,
but then salute the flag and implement them.
And when you can't, you have to step away.
The reason I was--
the withdrawal from Paris concerns me
from a policy level, is that, look,
the United States leadership requires that you leave--
that issues that are important to the international community,
and certainly to the partners we have
worked with most closely, that is Europeans, the Japanese.
I mean, these are relationships that date back 70 years.
Look, for them this is the major issue facing the world
over the next century.
And to step away from leadership really makes it---
will make it much more difficult when we look to those countries
to support us in the future.
And I think the big challenge, on a sort
of geopolitical level, is how to integrate a rising China
peacefully into the existing rules based
orders that's out there.
And you know, it's going to take a lot of cooperation.
It's going to be difficult to do.
And to the extent we have lost all credibility
with our closest partners, it's going to be that much harder.
STEVE EDWARDS: I want to get Professor Cui in on this.
But, just a quick followup, what should we
be doing, in your view as, a world community to provide
that kind of integrative, multilateral basis
you were talking about that's not happening now.
DAVID RANK: First of all, you have to be focused.
There are lots of concerns out there.
The international community can probably
focus on two or three major issues at a time,
so you got to pick your battles, you know.
You've got to--
I think, appropriately, the Obama administration
looked at climate change, they looked at the--
STEVE EDWARDS: Trade.
DAVID RANK: Iran.
And then, I think trade had been--
I mean, it's going to be a big issue.
The fact that the discontents you see in the United States
aren't just a Trump administration phenomenon.
They are widespread across the United States,
that there is something that needs
to be addressed with how the world deals
with each other commercially.
Some of it's a domestic issue.
How do we deal with the impacts of globalization?
But some of it is, how do we--
and it's inescapable that some of that
is that a system is straining to accommodate
what is now the largest economy in the world
and how does that fit into a system.
And I think that had to be--
that properly should have been a major focus
of this administration, and I don't think
that's going to be the case.
STEVE EDWARDS: Professor Cui, it's certainly the case,
as you would recognize, that past presidential
administration of the United States,
including the Obama administration,
had issues of disagreement with, not only President
Xi but past leadership in China, whether it's
South China Seas, or trade issues, or Asian bank,
those kinds of issues.
So how much are things really different now
between these two countries with the election of President
Trump?
CUI LIRU: Election of President Trump difference
is not that huge, and just, in my view, as an observer
from China.
I think I'm concerned the most about the direction
of our relationship.
STEVE EDWARDS: Broadly.
CUI LIRU: Broadly.
And that the framework is that a stable framework between us,
you know relations.
But the frictions of the conflict of interests, that
could happen anytime.
In some way, I deliberate to emphasize this competition
aspect of our relations.
So as the old saying goes, when you prepare for the worst,
you will be encouraged by any small progress.
[LAUGHTER]
CUI LIRU: So now we are concerned about this visit
of President Obama--
oh, no, President Trump to China.
And of course, I think there will be progress,
I'm sure, about that.
Because people in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
the state parliament, and our two governments
have worked very hard.
But there are some uncertainties concerning
even some big issues.
But that the competition become prominent is a fact.
I emphasize is mainly because China's rise and this change,
the balance structure.
When I say balance structure, mainly
means the power structure.
United States has been long time a predominant power there.
But China is a huge country, is going to rise up.
And so this is inevitably to happen.
So we have to handle that.
In some sense, this is a normal process.
And if we realize this is a normal process, inevitable,
but that does not mean we can just show the lingering around
and ignore these things.
We have to make endeavors to handle that.
But realize this historical evolution
is extremely important.
Between China and the United States,
I believe, for, I think, like, our agreement on the climate
change issues are very much important.
Because in this period, we do need
that kind of encouraging cooperation, achievements
to build up our mutual confidence.
And this is a huge issue.
And I think, this also a great demonstration and illustrated
China's progress.
Because in quite a few years, I think
as Mr. Rank knows very well, China
refused to have very much substantial dialogue
on these issues.
Because our priority is economic development, its gross.
But later I think, it becomes a serious issue
for China, not only for the climate change,
even for the gross, you have addressed
that at the same time.
So these reflect this process of China's development,
including our trade disputes now.
I think it could be like intellectual property rights
things.
And in China now, huge progress has been made.
And there is strong emphasis on the legal system
to address some of the problems there.
And so my view is that we could have differences,
but that when we move forward, step
by step, when the gap between us become
narrowed and we will have more and more common ground.
STEVE EDWARDS: I'm curious to get each of your responses
to this.
But as you see it, what are the strategic priorities,
and perhaps even more specifically,
what kind of relationship, ideally,
would China like to see happen as it emerges on the world
stage as this dominant force in economics and security,
and so forth?
So as China makes this peaceful rise,
what's important to China, that is?
CUI LIRU: Important to China, I think the competition, when
we call the strategic competition, mainly
in the aspect of political and the security area,
or political and the military areas,
China-US relation is that kind of framework,
or what I call the duality.
That it is--
STEVE EDWARDS: Duality.
CUI LIRU: Yes.
On one hand, we have our economic interdependence.
But this economic interdependence
have very little to do with our strategic relationship there.
So--
STEVE EDWARDS: What do you mean?
CUI LIRU: Because for example, United States
has Asian Alliance.
But this alliance system excludes China.
And now, I just mentioned a point there.
And nos this become the problem.
When China has disputes with one of the allies,
and the United States feel obliged to intervene.
And this become a big problem between us.
So then, the US alliance system, Asian,
becomes something threatening in terms of security to China.
So we have to address that, because it's very complicated.
It's not easy to do that.
But I think if China-United States will accommodate
in this area, United States, traditional power, United
States involvement the presence in this area,
it will stay continue there.
But China is rising up.
And China's interest, in some way, expanded.
So how to accommodate these two developments
is extremely important.
I don't think we can find the solution very soon.
But I think a dialogue is very important,
and a frank, substantial dialogue on that.
And the US should, anyway, sooner or later,
will adjust itself to the new reality.
And for China side, should be patient.
And should not expect the situation will change,
US policy will change, overnight.
So we-- both of us, we will realize this process
is important and then find our common ground.
STEVE EDWARDS: David, what's your sense of this,
and particularly the sense of China's strategic objectives
as it continues its emergence?
DAVID RANK: Well, I won't speak to China's
strategic objectives.
But Dr. Cui mentioned a--
talking about the United States adjusting itself
to the new realities, and I get back to TPP.
Because I think that the failure to pass TPP
is really, to me, a critical strategic mistake on our part.
And in the sense that, TPP was an effort to adjust
the realities in our favor, which is to extend Amer---
the re-balance, which to Asia, which
was policy under the Obama administration
to shift resources in a lot of areas.
One, security but also the political attention
we paid to the region, but then also economically
and commercially with TPP.
Wasn't a recognition, not of the need
to contain China, but that's where the--
that is where the global growth is,
where the energy in the global system is.
And we are better off investing our energies
in that part of the world than in the Middle East,
or elsewhere, where I would say it's
a much less positive narrative.
You know, that sort of high watermark
is not going to be as high in Asia.
And TPP, I mean, look, the region wants us
there for a lot of reasons.
They are concerned about a growing China,
about growing Chinese political influence, economic influence,
and military influence.
And they see the United States as a balance in that regard.
But they don't want us just as a security balance.
I mean, that's not interesting to the region.
And I don't think it's valuable to us
to just be the guarantor of security in the region.
I think what's interesting to all sides is the United
States that has a stake in the economic success of the region,
including China, and that is committed
long term on a bipartisan basis to being there.
I tend to think about the US-China relationship not just
in terms of the bilateral relationship.
But I think the United States, we
do less well when we think bilaterally.
We are the beneficiaries of 70 years of global structures
and global institutions.
And I think, to the extent we can think of those terms,
we advance our interests and we advance
the interests of the region.
So things like TPP, I think, I'm a Cubs fan.
I'm optimistic that in the long run we will get back to that.
But for now, we are where we are.
STEVE EDWARDS: Yeah.
Professor Cui, you were talking also
about the need for dialogue, strategic dialogue.
There have been formal processes and informal processes
for that over the course of the past several administrations.
And David, I'd love your thoughts on this as well.
We hear reports out of the State Department,
out of the administration, not only that Rex Tillerson's time
may be may be shortened as Secretary of State,
but there are lots of unfilled positions
in key diplomatic posts around the world.
That there is an exodus of top personnel in various posts.
So there's a sense, at least if the reports are to be believed,
there's a void in US diplomatic ranks.
What impact is that having, if any,
on the kind of dialogue that I think both of
you have underscored is important here?
CUI LIRU: I think it--
heavy impact, mainly because these vacuums,
these important positions, posts.
For example, I don't know, and Councillor Home is here.
When you prepare this visit, and some posts in the middle level
are extremely important, primary important to do that.
But without --
STEVE EDWARDS: But they're engaging together.
CUI LIRU: Of course, of course, there
are close engagement between the two diplomatic services there,
and there's no doubt of that.
But for me, I just have some topics
discussed with my American colleagues,
think tanks in Washington, DC.
I trying to discuss with them, is this
going to be US-Asian policy?
Because this is a first time for President Trump
to visit Asia, this some major countries
and important countries in this trip.
And so far, I haven't seen the new administration producing
a framework of Asian policy.
And what it's doing is just, is anything but Obama.
So--
STEVE EDWARDS: That's the policy.
Anything, yeah-- the opposite of Obama.
CUI LIRU: But I think there are some continuities there,
I think, although they said something like that.
But still, I think it's important,
Asia to coordinate these different bilateral relations
with the framework of the Asian policy.
And especially, when China-US relations
become major when in this area, and also
in terms of the regional order, and that we should cooperate.
But at the same time, the nations
have different interests, to how to coordinate that.
So you do not have enough people to have
more comprehensive or serious study on these issues,
especially to adapt your policy to the new realities.
So there should be some problem in the world
when discuss these concrete issues.
So this is something, I think should be made up
in the United States policies.
On the other hand, I think the framework, the dialogue,
in the Florida, Mar-a-Lago, I think that is good.
That was--
STEVE EDWARDS: In Mar-a-Lago
CUI LIRU: Mar-a-Lago produce some very positive result
for the sort of framework of our bilateral relations,
but still have some temporary characteristics.
And then another thing is, seems very confusing,
different signals from the administration.
And opinion even, then Tillerson said something
and undercut by the President Trump.
So this is not good things.
STEVE EDWARDS: How is that read, when
we see that kind of lack of consistency in China,
among Chinese leadership?
CUI LIRU: Oh, it's-- yeah, it's a very good question.
People have very different interpretations
on these different signals.
So it could have some confusions.
But my-- excuse me.
I myself, in this situation I just
focus on the major trends, and the background,
and the framework, and the major issues
to see in the general directions.
But if we-- technically, you want to make concrete judgment,
it kind of difficult.
STEVE EDWARDS: Yeah.
David, what's your insight on some of the questions
I just asked Professor Cui, regarding
the staffing within our diplomatic ranks, the impact
that has, and, at times, the seeming conflict
or inconsistencies in the messages we're communicating?
DAVID RANK: Right.
So I got back to Washington in June, or something like that,
saw some friends.
And one of them just laughed at me,
said, how did you end up to be the poster child for opposition
to this administration?
[LAUGHTER]
I'm the world's most conservative person.
And how did I end up--
STEVE EDWARDS: Lowercase c.
DAVID RANK: That's right.
Lowercase c, in the real sense of the word, lowercase c.
That look, I mean, what we're doing right now
is, we are squandering the resource
of American leadership, of confidence
in how the United States will react internationally.
And I think, less understood outside of Washington,
is to the extent to which we're squandering
a resource of experience in the federal government,
not just in the State Department,
but across the bureaucracy, and the EPA, and the Department
of Energy, and organizations where people-- look,
you want to work for a place where you're on the asset side.
You're seen as an asset and not a liability.
And it matters, internationally, because, you know,
to be a leader it's not something you get for free.
You got to lead, you've got to be out there.
That means you have to go to meetings,
you have to understand what the issues are,
you have to have positions that have been developed,
and you have to advocate for them,
and understand where the rest of the world is.
And if you don't have the people to do it,
who don't understand what's happened, or don't have
the ear of the administration, it really undercuts that,
and it's hard to build back up.
And so I mean, I think that the problem
is there's no other country in the world that
can play that role.
The United States has been that coordinating, played that role,
for decades.
China is stepping forward, in some ways,
but in some ways, look, I understand, China wasn't there
at the foundation of some of these institutions,
and has its own view how they should operate.
That's perfectly-- I mean, that's understandable.
But I think the international order,
as it has functioned for the last 70 years,
has been pretty good for everyone.
And so I worry when we are in the process of setting that
aside without knowing clearly what's there to replace it.
STEVE EDWARDS: Yeah, I want to take your questions
in just a quick second.
But there has been this sense, and people
have written about it, that as it relates
to a multilateral set of engagements,
that China is much more interested
in bilateral relations, broadly speaking, instead
of multilateral institutions.
Is that a fair characterization or what's the reality?
CUI LIRU: My observation is that China
try to strike a balance between the multilateral
in the bilateral.
And of course, we have to be realistic.
Some bilateral relations is more important than some others.
Such as China-US relations, this major country
bilateral relations have weighed a lot more
than some other relationships.
But it is going to be more and more
important to have these multilateral cooperation
becomes some new momentum.
Because the integration, and the globalization, and the like
global issues are our common thread.
So we have to cooperate.
And cooperate China's emphasises is
on these multilateral platforms, such as the UN,
is the core of these platforms.
STEVE EDWARDS: There's much more to ask you about.
We haven't even talked about key issues of critical concern
that some of you touched on.
But let me get at questions from those of you.
So if you have a question, raise your hand,
and we'll get a microphone over to you.
And ask that you pose your question about any--
AUDIENCE: I wonder what cooperation between the United
States and China dealing with North Korea
might provide a model, as well as a particular, very important
issue to deal with, but along the lines of,
well, a lot of people say that Kim Jong-un, because he
saw what happened to Gaddafi, feels
he has to keep nuclear weapons.
But one could flip that over and say,
it's because of the extremely monstrous tyranny
that Kim Jong-un exercises that he needs nuclear weapons.
So I wonder whether there might be cooperation
toward having such coercion that would force some reform, if not
regime change in North Korea.
STEVE EDWARDS: That's great.
What about that issue of cooperation as it
relates to the North Korean situation?
CUI LIRU: You want to say?
DAVID RANK: Sure.
I think we're doomed to have to cooperate on North Korea,
right?
I mean, look, it's a terrible problem.
It affects both of our really central strategic issues.
I wouldn't necessarily choose that one to highlight as the--
because, I would pick a problem that can be solved.
This is going to be a really--
STEVE EDWARDS: That's thorny.
DAVID RANK: Yeah, it's thorny.
STEVE EDWARDS: So as a--
I want to come back to North Korea.
But what might be an example of a low hanging
fruit for cooperation, a place where we can do more together,
and then I'll come to North Korea.
Right.
DAVID RANK: I mean look, if you look at--
again, I talked about it in my sort of prepared remarks.
Under the Obama administration, it
was really striking the extent to which the United
States and China cooperated on issues that a lot of people
didn't pay attention to.
Again, the Paris Treaty was a multinational treaty,
198 countries.
But really, at its heart, it was the US and China working out
a deal and then taking it to the rest of the world and saying,
this is where we're going.
And the rest of the world signing on.
The Iran deal was similar, that--
although then United States was instrumental in orchestrating
the position of the EU and major EU--
STEVE EDWARDS: But are there other things now
that are on the table, that we're not
paying close attention to, that actually have--
as a Cubs fan, with your eternal optimism--
have the possibility, in this current climate
of being moved forward with the administration?
DAVID RANK: In the current climate.
STEVE EDWARDS: Yes.
DAVID RANK: I would say, look, the US and China have
to figure out what's going on with trade,
both bilaterally and multilaterally.
It's the global consensus on trade is corroding,
it's damaging the ability to support the institutions that
are there.
And if we cannot figure out how to operate--
how the system's going to operate,
it's going to be bad for everyone.
My concern is that the level of incoherence in Washington
does not appear to be a negotiating thing, that it
appears to be incoherence.
And that will make it really hard
to get at those really fundamental issues.
STEVE EDWARDS: Yeah, well then, let's
come to the thorny issue of North Korea.
One of the things we've heard from the President, time
and again, on Twitter and other platforms,
is he wants to see China take a much more active role
than he believes that China is currently
taking on this question.
So my question to you is, how involved is China
and what additional--
why isn't there more leverage being
brought to bear on this particular situation?
CUI LIRU: OK, I think DPRK nuclear issue
is a extremely important issue.
And cooperation between China and United States
is extremely relevant to address that issue.
We used to be-- have a very important platform
for cooperation, that is six party talks.
And we did them well, and produce this 2005
joint statement, and which is still
is a very useful framework for future possible solutions,
I guess.
And then unfortunately, the six party talks process
has just suspended.
Then in some way our cooperation has
shifted into the UN platform.
[LAUGHS] That mainly, just to--
when DPRK tests this missile, nuclear weapons, then
UN Security discuss about resolutions
to strengthen the sanction measures.
So on that platform then, the way
cooperate to produce the resolutions.
Of course, there are negotiations
and different interests should be balanced.
And so this is two different forms.
But I would rather see the importance
of nuclear cooperation on these issues,
because it reflect the two major powers in this area, which
are responsible and especially important
for the stability and the peace in this area.
But we can tell the difference from nowadays
from several years before, is because
of the strategic competition between our two countries,
and the strategic suspicions and growing.
And these kind of suspicions becomes
some of the problems for our further cooperation,
when the challenges become more and more serious.
So this is the problem.
But in America, I think, many people, including
President Trump and some others, emphasize that China should
bear the major responsibility.
And they press China then to take care of North Korea.
And they believe that's the approach to address that.
I think that is wrong, and China can play a very important role,
that's true.
But if we want to find the truce and that the essence,
fundamentally, in this issue, that
is the problem between the United States and North Korea,
the hostilities and the lack of peace agreement.
So we have to address in this level.
And address this aspect, China can also play roles.
But the United States initiatives and the roles
are first and foremost important.
STEVE EDWARDS: What's the way out of this?
As we see this escalating rhetoric,
I think many people around the world
feel that we're closer to the brink of a military conflict
and perhaps the use of nuclear weapons on either side
than we've been in several decades.
What is the pathway forward?
CUI LIRU: You--
STEVE EDWARDS: Yeah, either of you.
[LAUGHTER]
OK.
DAVID RANK: I mean, look, maybe because I'm a diplomat
or I was a diplomat, it seems inescapable
you have to get to a negotiated outcome.
I don't know what it looks like.
But I've been in negotiations, rarely
do you know what the outcome looks like when you start.
I mean, the way you negotiate an outcome is first you
make it possible to negotiate.
Then you talk, and then you get the outcome.
And you know, we're having problems with that first step,
right?
I agree with Professor Cui on--
look, the US and China have actually cooperated pretty well
at the UN.
It has been reactive, not active.
In other words, we're reacting to North Korean steps.
And, look, the goal of US-China cooperation
is not to have sanctions but to resolve the problem.
So to my mind, what's happened at the UN,
if we look at it as creating bargaining
chips for negotiation, that's one thing.
But if it isn't, then I'm not sure
the value of cooperating with the UN.
Because, when you introduced me, you
noted I worked on our Korea desk a long,
long time ago, before some of the people in this room
were born.
STEVE EDWARDS: [LAUGHS]
DAVID RANK: And I have, hanging on my wall,
an award for solving the North Korean nuclear problem back
then.
STEVE EDWARDS: [LAUGHS]
DAVID RANK: And the statue of limitations
is I didn't have to turn it back in when that turned out
not to be the case.
[LAUGHTER]
But you know, as we were negotiating, the DPRK,
they were in the middle of a famine that
killed three million people, and it didn't really
have an impact on their negotiating position.
So the idea that just exerting economic pressure
will force the North Koreans to give up
their program I think is wrong.
I mean, there's historical proof to say it's wrong.
So I mean, unless you're willing to contemplate nuclear war,
and I think a conventional war would create such a calamity
for our allies in the region, and for North Korea
and for China.
All of the military options would seem to be unthinkable.
So you have to think about, how do we get to negotiations.
You know, and then the next step is,
what happens in those negotiations
and, you know, a long way down the road.
STEVE EDWARDS: Did you want to add something quickly to that?
CUI LIRU: Sure.
I think if you want my observations on this issue,
you give me a couple of minutes, I will say that.
I think this is very much important.
And we have to face the realities.
We have to admit the situation is different from before.
And the DPRK already develops nuclear progress
and huge progress there.
And my opinion is that they will not
give up their nuclear weapons.
So that's the fact.
And it won't work.
That won't be the option that, as some more educated,
to use the military actions.
That will not solve the problem.
It's not workable.
And because the consequence is too huge, and we cannot bear.
So then what?
I think negotiation dialogue, dialogue
on the current realities.
We cannot go back to the 10 years ago point.
So I think Tillerson's Four No Principle
is a very good positive one as the basis for the negotiations.
But one of the problem is--
STEVE EDWARDS: These are the Four Nos
that suggest that, among other things,
the United States is not pushing for regime change.
CUI LIRU: That's right, that's what I said.
STEVE EDWARDS: Trying to create the framework
for some degree of comfort around US
longer term objectives.
CUI LIRU: The problem is, the outside is not sure,
if this Four Nos are the US adminstration policy.
Because Tillerson said President Trump doesn't say that,
and that even say something different.
So this is a problem.
I think if Trump said, this is our policy,
that could have great positive impact on that.
Then we can, OK, I just stop with the-- we
can cooperate based on that.
STEVE EDWARDS: Yeah, that would set a framework that
might open space [INAUDIBLE]
CUI LIRU: I think so.
STEVE EDWARDS: Yes.
AUDIENCE: Hello, everyone.
I am a first year master's student from China
and feel this honor to ask the question.
Actually, my question is for Mr. Rank.
So you talk about a lot of, like, past bilateral relations,
but my question is, as we all know that United States is
pretty realistic and based on-- what
do you think about the possibilities
that United States will consider its role based
on the current situation of China and America?
Thank you.
DAVID RANK: I mean, I-- look, I think
US policy has always been based on the current situation.
I mean, I think, we get a bad rap,
sometimes, we pointy-headed bureaucrats and diplomats.
But you know, there's a lot of experience
within the US government working with China, people
who have long, long experience, who understand where China has
been and where China is, and are pretty realistic about what
the issues we have to resolve are.
I mean, there are probably as many popular misconceptions
about China here in the United States
as there are popular misconceptions about the United
States in China.
But at a government level, I think
it's a pretty realistic assessment of where interests
align, where they don't align, and, you know,
how to discuss the problems that we have.
I always felt like, until I blew up my career,
that I had permanent job security, because there
are always going to be big problems in US-China relations.
Because we're big countries, we have lots of interests,
and they inevitably don't align.
For nations, that may not be a good thing.
For individuals dealing with that relationship,
it's a great thing.
[LAUGHTER]
Always have work.
STEVE EDWARDS: Always work to be done.
We have a question here with [INAUDIBLE]
and then one over here.
Yeah.
AUDIENCE: Two administrations ago,
in fact when Secretary Paulson was in the administration,
the strategic dialogue was initiated
and then it has evolved, and now is
become what's known as the comprehensive dialogue.
Can you give us some perspective on that and how it's operated?
And perhaps also, given that it now it's
called the comprehensive dialogue, to what extent
it actually could be productive and useful?
Thank you.
DAVID RANK: Sure.
Look, every time there's a new administration,
there is a new name to the dialogue.
That is-- I'm not cynical, but, you know, I think part of it
is you want to show that you're different from the previous
administration.
And part of it is, I think less cynically,
you want to learn the lessons that, you know,
what the problems were with the previous method of engaging,
and try to adjust them to current situations.
I haven't had much experience with
the comprehensive dialogue, the new one,
versus the old strategic and economic dialogue.
I think any dialogue is limited.
You can't change the interests of a country
through a dialogue.
So you know, there was frustration that, wow, we never
fixed our disagreements about the South China Sea, or Taiwan,
or [? Diaoyu ?] and Senkaku, you know, the East China Sea
Islands, in these dialogues, so why do we have them.
That's not a problem of the dialogue, that's
a problem of the fact that we just have different interests,
and we look at the world differently.
That doesn't mean it's not important to talk.
I mean, I think it probably makes
it more important to talk.
What I thought, and as someone--
it pains me to say this, because as someone
who coordinated this S&ED, the last strategic and economic
dialogue, I will tell you that they were a ton of work.
And they occupied a huge amount of energy from both systems.
And people were really frustrated with it
because of the amount of work it took
to get that many cabinet secretaries
and senior Chinese officials in the same room,
and all of the work preparing it.
But there's not-- when you're not fixing these big problems.
But what they did what the S&ED did was,
it got together people who wouldn't ordinarily
get the attention of senior decision-makers,
on issues that maybe weren't the highest priorities, things
like wildlife trafficking, or the bilateral investment
treaty.
You know, how would we work together on those issues.
And it gave them a forum to elevate it to high levels.
And the new structure is more streamlined,
and it gets rid of some of that, and there's
less sort of running around, and flapping of arms,
and exchanging of papers.
But I'm concerned that, it also, what that means is, we're
not going to fix the high level issues.
Because those I think you have to manage through dialogue.
But then how do we focus on these--
how do we bring attention to what will, I think,
always be lower level issues where we can make progress?
AUDIENCE: Hi.
Thank you guys for being here today.
My name's Elaine, I'm a first year student at the Harris
School of Public Policy here.
I think we've talked a lot about how the changes
on the American side, with Trump being president
and how that's impacted US-China relations.
But I think, I want to piggyback off
that last question about how some of the upcoming
changes perhaps on the China side
might be impacting US-China relations.
I think it's the 19th party Congress is happening soon.
Typically speaking, you know, this
is also the time we'll kind of sort of find out who
Xi's successor might be, right?
Just want to hear what your thoughts or insights
on that regard.
CUI LIRU: About China side, I think
both countries are undergoing very important changes.
And in China's side, the same is true.
In the domestic, socially, and politically,
is substantial, important changes there, as you know,
which becomes more and more associated
with the foreign policy issues, such as DPRK nuclear issues.
In China, the views become more and more diversified,
very divided.
My guess is that from the higher level, to the lower level,
to the grassroot people have very different views.
And they voice different views in various occasions.
And this could bring very much test and impact
on the policy making process.
I think the same is true in the United States,
that domestic politics play a more important role
than before in foreign policies.
And so I would like to see the political leaders, in some way,
to--
can be strong enough to resist these short term
domestic political interests, than to have a longer term
perspective when they try to address
the big issues, strategic issues.
And also we see, the China side you see, the internet,
then you call this information era.
And so everyone is a specialist, a commentator.
And then they express their opinions.
And I think the officials, when they go back to home
and they have dinner with family, friends,
and they can hear various kind of opinions.
Could be positive, could be negative.
And these are all the changes which
are very much different from 10, 15 years ago in China.
And another thing is China has to be very frank,
a very important political campaign,
that is anti-corruption campaign.
And an anti-corruption campaign can
touch upon many people, many officials.
It's going on.
We don't see the end.
And the President Jinping said, we
don't set a date when it will end.
If it's needed, we will carry on.
So this political campaign could have
very important political impact on various aspect.
And I think the outsiders must realize these, what's
going on there, what kind of impact on there,
and what kind of complexities added to the leadership,
to the decision making process, which is extremely important.
STEVE EDWARDS: David, what's your perspective?
DAVID RANK: I mean, I think it's an excellent point that people,
because we do things so publicly in the United States,
you look at the sort of disarray in the current administration.
But there is a significant degree of that in China,
as well, as tens of thous-- millions of peo--
a lot of Chinese officials have come
under investigation, run into problems
with the anti-corruption campaign.
So there is a significant amount of churn in the Chinese system,
as well.
You know, as you were asking your question,
it made me think, you know, there is a real disconnect
in how our two systems work.
I mean, we understand, the American system understands,
that the state is subordinate to the party.
But we don't have real, regular access to the party.
I mean, there is a disconnect in how we communicate
with the real decision makers.
You know, the counterpart to Rex Tillerson,
who's the number four person in our constitutional order,
is on the books, Wang yi, the foreign minister,
but Wang yi is not the number four decision maker
in the Chinese system, right?
If you were to suggest that he's anywhere close to that,
people would--
I mean he's a delightful man, but no one
would suggest that he's that same level of influence.
And so there, it just highlights for me that disconnect.
And you know, it also feeds into the concern
on the Chinese side, that the United States never
has come to grips, come to terms with the People's
Republic of China, that China run by the Communist Party.
And you know, look our system, they are just
different systems.
But the fact that we don't have a mechanism
for our sort of ruling institutions
to interact with China's ruling institutions
is a problem, both at the operational level,
but also at that level of mutual understanding.
STEVE EDWARDS: Yeah, I want to get to this one last question
here.
But before I do, I'd love to tie this, in some respects,
back to the overarching theme for the rest of the day.
I'm going to oversimplify the political dynamics
in the United States, certainly, because what's
happened during the last election cycle
is more complicated than this.
But it has often been seen through this prism
of increasing divisions in the United States manifest in one
perspective by urban and rural divisions
in urban rural communities, in a sense of a growing
malaise and unease among both economically, culturally,
and otherwise, with people in the United States
in more rural areas.
Again, oversimplifying.
But is that-- given the rapid urbanization that's happening,
not only all over the, globe but particularly in China,
are we seeing any parallels in the kind
of social, and economic, and cultural responses
within China as we've been dealing with here
in the United States?
CUI LIRU: I think very important.
The big parallels is they are two big countries.
And as two big countries, for the political leaders,
they could have very much these parallel requirements
and parallel conditions.
I think social conditions and the political conditions,
even some, like, geographical conditions, like disasters,
and all these natural disasters that happened
and the top leaders have to pay attention,
and they have to make a trip to these kind of things.
I think is a huge hin-- and multilaterally,
in this global affairs, I think, we
have more and more parallel responsibilities to do that,
that for the major countries.
STEVE EDWARDS: What impact, from your perspective,
is the rapid urbanization having on the political and cultural
landscape within China?
DAVID RANK: So I--
I'll take a family example.
My wife is one of five kids.
She was raised in a farm about four hours south of here.
All five of those kids went to the University of Illinois
and never moved back.
And that's-- I mean, a Chinese family would understand that
because it's a similar dynamic, that, you know,
the flow of talent from the countryside to the city is
pretty parallel between here and China.
It was, I think, more spread out here in the United States.
In China it happened in a very short period.
And the other side of that is there was, I think,
sort of breathless expectation that the internet would level
things out, that it would allow smaller communities
to be economically vibrant, and vital, and sort of engaged
in the global economy.
And that hasn't really happened.
You know, if you look where economic growth has occurred
it's been in the big cities.
And continues to be that proximity has
driven economic development.
And so if you look at China's rural areas,
China is struggling with how do you bring development
to that part of the country.
And the answer has been to bring the cities
to those part of the country, of real focus
and a plan on urbanization.
You know, in the United States, were not big planners.
But it's the same issue, at the heart of it, I think.
STEVE EDWARDS: I'm going to have that be the last word.
I think that's a fitting note to end on.
And we'll set up conversations that follow, with my apologies
to the remaining questioner.
Hopefully, you can connect with David and Professor Cui
here in the break that's upcoming.
But join me if you would, in the meantime,
in thanking David Rank and Cui Liru
for being such insightful conversants in this.
Thank you so much, Professors.
DAVID RANK: Thank you.
STEVE EDWARDS: Thank you.
[APPLAUSE]
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